






Varying cross-sectional volatility in the South African equity market and 




School of Management Studies, University of Cape Town,  
Private Bag X3, Rondebosch 7701, and  
University of Stellenbosch Business School, PO Box 610, Bellville 7535 
Republic of South Africa 
heidiraub@telkomsa net 
 
Received February 2010 
 
Modern portfolio theory is founded on an understanding of longitudinal volatility but it is the cross-sectional dispersion 
among investment returns that provide active portfolio managers with their competitive investment opportunities. The 
varying cross-sectional volatility in the South African equity market provides varying opportunity sets for active 
managers: the higher the cross-sectional volatility, the greater the opportunity for active risk taking, all other things being 
equal. This article argues that cross-sectional volatility must be considered hand-in-hand with risk limits and active risk 
targets when investment mandates are set and when mandated risk compliance is monitored.  
 





Sapra (2008), Ankrim and Ding (2002) and De Silva, Sapra 
and Thorley (2001), amongst others, point out that modern 
portfolio theory is founded on an understanding and an 
emphasis on time series or longitudinal volatility. Both 
Markowitz‟s groundbreaking 1952 introduction of a mean-
variance paradigm and the Fundamental Law of Active 
Management
1
, “Alpha is IC times volatility times score” 
require a time-series estimation of risk. This estimation 
usually involves successive periods of realised or forecast 
performance.  
 
But when fund managers decide on how to allocate the finite 
pool of assets under their management among various 
investments, it is the cross-sectional dispersion of expected 
returns that is required in order to provide them with a 
reasonable opportunity for expressing relative preferences. 
As Sapra (2008) points out, if all securities had perfect 
correlations with each other, there would be no cross-
sectional dispersion in their returns and therefore no way for 
an active manager to achieve excess-of-benchmark 
performance or incur any active risk. Without cross-
sectional volatility, the active fund manager would be 
unable to deliver performance which was in any way distinct 
from their benchmark or any of their competitors.  
 
Solnik and Roulet (2000) explored the nature of cross-
sectional correlation in the context of discerning the 
relationships between global markets as part of the global 
allocation decision. Traditionally, longitudinal or time-series 
data would be used to estimate correlation between the 
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Grinold (1989) and Grinold (1994). 
 
various global markets‟ performances. Typically, this would 
be done using a rolling 60 month window of simultaneous 
returns across world markets.  
 
Solnik and Roulet (2000) point out that there are several 
problems with this type of measurement of global 
correlations. Firstly, the measurement of longitudinal 
relationships is unconditional i.e. it assumes that the 
relationships between global markets don‟t change over time 
and neither do the distributions of the returns of these 
markets. Furthermore, each subsequent estimate is highly 
dependent on the previous estimate and therefore also 
resistant to changes in the global market relationships. 
Although various weighted measures and autoregressive 
solutions exist for this problem, they either require a large 
number of estimations, a diagonal matrix or an ad hoc 
system of time-series weights which don‟t necessarily solve 
the dependence problem. 
 
Solnik and Roulet (2000) propose that a cross-sectional, 
“instantaneous” measure of correlation is more appropriate 
and more capable of picking up on changing trends in 
market relationships. These authors find that the cross-
sectional method they proposed is more dynamic and that 
changes in this measure helped predict changes in the 
longitudinal estimation better than a time series approach 
would. 
 
Changes in the volatility, either longitudinal or cross-
sectional, are of concern to investors and asset management 
selectors as they signal changes in the professional money 
management environment. Bernstein (1998) observed an 





1997) of fund returns in the US as well as the decreasing 
spread in the top performing portfolios relative to the 
benchmark. In this article, Bernstein puts forward two 
hypotheses: a) markets have become increasingly 
competitive and therefore it is increasingly difficult to 
significantly outperform the competition or b) risk 
management and the fear of being “wrong and alone”
 2
 has 
created convergent investments across portfolios without the 
concentration of risk required to produce star performance. 
Bernstein provides some tantalising but exploratory 
empirics into the latter and this hypothesis would provide a 
fascinating future research project into the behaviour of 
professional money managers. However, in this article it is 
the former hypothesis is that is of interest.  
 
Bernstein (1998) uses baseball as an analogy of what 
happens to star performers when the variation in the 
performance of all athletes wanes. In 130 years of baseball 
data, the batting averages have hardly varied. However, the 
standard deviation around that long-term mean has 
diminished and reached a plateau. The consequence of this 
diminishing variation has been the disappearance of the 
“.400 star hitter”. While new records continue to be set in 
individual sports, stars within team sports can disappear as a 
consequence of improved defence and competitive 
strategies.  
 
Bernstein (1998) likened this to the field of professional 
investment management where he mused that the US stock 
market may have become increasingly efficient. Bernstein 
went so far as to show the waning of the spread in Warren 
Buffet‟s portfolios‟ performance (the investment 
management equivalent of a star athlete!) relative to the 
S&P 500 up to this 1998 article. Bernstein argues that even 
a skilled, star investor such as Buffet, with no regard for 
benchmarks, has found his portfolio‟s performance spread 
relative to the S&P 500 decreasing over time. 
 
However, subsequent to 1997, Ankrim and Ding (2002) 
observed an increase in market volatility and noticed that the 
cross-sectional volatility of the market was also increasing. 
Ankrim and Ding (2002) makes the connection between 
longitudinal or time-series volatility and cross-sectional 
volatility, deriving a mathematical link between overall 
market volatility, sector volatility and intra-sector, cross-
sectional volatility. (Their results hold whether sectors are 
considered or not.)  
 
The authors, mindful of the thinking of the time (2001) that 
equity market volatility was on the increase, questioned the 
fact that active portfolio returns were increasing in their 
dispersion in the same way and suggest that both are a 
function of increasing cross-sectional volatility, which is, 
after all, the environment in which an active manager is 
active.  
 
Ankrim and Ding (2002) postulates a number of possible 
reasons for the observed increase in cross-sectional volatility 
at the time, namely: the trend towards smaller, more 
focussed companies; companies listing their equity earlier in 
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A phrase coined by Mark Kritzman in his 1998 article, "Wrong and 
Alone". 
the company‟s life cycle than has been the case historically, 
the influence of day-traders, less expensive trading and 
greater financial innovation, increases in financial leverage 
and shocks to the discount rates applied to company 
valuations. Certainly, the South African and other 
emerging/developing markets are subject to similar trends 
and practices and the effects may well be seen in our 
changing equity volatility. 
 
De Silva et al. (2001) observed the highest recorded cross-
sectional volatility in the US in 1999 (increasing from the 
last quarter of 1998 to 2000). In this article, the authors 
speculate as to the reason for this unprecedented dispersion, 
which they say economic historians would suggest is 
attributable to fundamental changes in the competitive 
advantages among companies. The authors suggest a new 
factor in security returns such as the impact of technology or 
alternatively a purely idiosyncratic event as possible 
culprits. The focus of De Silva et al. (2001) is to remedy the 
view of ex post performance in the light of varying cross-
sectional dispersion. 
 
Ten years before the De Silva et al. (2001) article, Sharpe 
(1991) addressed the basic arithmetic of ex post portfolio 
performance measurement without any market efficiency 
assumptions or statistical simplifications required. Sharpe 
(1991) points out that when we consider the performance of 
various managers at any point in time in an equally 
weighted manner in order to assess their relative success, we 
incur various biases and mathematical violations. 
 
Firstly, Sharpe (1991) makes the point that the average 
actively managed dollar (i.e. capitalisation weighted) 
cannot, before costs, deliver performance different to the 
average passively managed dollar. It follows that, after 
costs, capitalisation weighted investment dollars must 
underperform passive dollars when actively managed. 
Although mathematically obvious, Sharpe points out several 
performance monitoring practices that violate these basic 
tenets.  
 
Firstly, when active portfolios which are compelled to hold 
cash are compared to equity-only benchmarks, the average 
dollar so invested will underperform the benchmark in good 
times and over perform in bad times. Another classic case of 
inappropriate averaging is when only surviving portfolios 
are used as a performance comparison. Survivorship bias 
omits the dollars that were transferred to another investment 
portfolio during the performance period in question. 
 
Sharpe also points out the potential for a small-cap bias 
when equally-weighted manager averages are compared to 
the market as a whole. If portfolios of smaller fund sizes 
show a preference to smaller capitalisation stocks as is 
typical, the “average” portfolio will overweight smaller 
portfolios, thereby overweighting small caps in the 
“average” performance.  
 
Small-cap bias is one of the reasons that capitalisation peer 
group comparisons are ill-advised. The most compelling 
argument against peer benchmarks are that, since 
capitalisation-weighted active portfolios will, by virtue of 





costs, a peer group benchmark is necessarily an 
underperforming benchmark relative to a passive 
capitalisation-weighted index. 
 
De Silva et al. (2001) extends the Sharpe (1991) argument 
regarding fund returns and their relationship to stock returns 
by showing that the value-weighted cross sectional 
dispersion of security returns must necessarily be related to 
the value-weighted cross section dispersion of active 
portfolio returns. Although diversification within portfolios 
would necessarily mean that portfolio returns are less 
dispersed than security returns, the relationship between the 
cross-sectional variations in each would hold. 
 
De Silva et al. (2001) derives a mathematical relationship 
between security return dispersion, market return and 
idiosyncratic risk (refer Equation 1) to inform the 
expectation of dispersion among securities. Relying on some 
simplifications, specifically an equally-weighted market 
portfolio and a common distribution of idiosyncratic risk 
across stocks at any given time
3
, this derivation shows that 
expected cross sectional dispersion increases with a) 
increasing dispersion among stock betas, increasing 
idiosyncratic risk across stocks and market performance that 
differs increasingly from the risk free rate (either positively 
or negatively).  
 
Equation 1: Relationship between market dispersion and 
security dispersion 
 
 (  
 )      
 (         )
 
     




 (  
 ) is the expected (equal-weighted) cross-sectional 
dispersion among securities over an investment period, t, 
 
    
  is the cross-sectional variance of stock betas around one 
over this same period, 
 
          is the excess-of-risk-free rate return of the (equal-
weighted) market over the investment period, t and 
 
    
  is the idiosyncratic risk which is the same for all stocks 
over this period.  
 
De Silva et al. (2001) extends this derivation to illustrate the 
relationship between portfolio performance dispersion and 
overall market performance (refer Equation 2). It follows 
that, since both portfolio and security dispersion are related 
to idiosyncratic risk, portfolio and security dispersion must 
also be related to each other.  
Equation 2: Relationship between portfolio dispersion 
and security dispersion 
 
 (  
 )     
 (     )
     
  
where  
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The derivation has the CAPM segmentation of return as its starting 
point. Without a common distribution of idiosyncratic return from 
which to draw each stock‟s idiosyncratic return, the cross-sectional 
distribution of stock returns would be complex and non-normal. 
 (  
 ) is the expected (equal-weighted) cross-sectional 
dispersion among portfolios of securities, 
 
   
  is the cross-sectional variance of portfolio betas (which, 
if stocks are selected randomly will be 






  is the idiosyncratic risk of portfolios of securities (which, 
under the assumption of zero correlation among 




 where N is the 
number of stocks randomly selected in the portfolio. 
 
Empirically, in their 2001 study, the authors find a 
coefficient of determination (R-squared) of 91% between 
the annual dispersion in the value weighted active portfolio 
performances in US equity mutual funds
4
 and the weighted 
cross-sectional volatility of securities on the US market 
from 1981 to 2000. They conclude that there must therefore 
be very little that changes in market efficiency, manager 
talent or changing trends in asset management (such as a 
trend towards specialised portfolios or concentrated 
portfolios etc) can be contributing to the dispersion in 
portfolio manager performances. Furthermore, the article 
finds no evidence of a time trend in the relationship between 
market dispersion and portfolio dispersion in the US. 
 
Yu and Sharaiha (2007) develop the findings of De Silva et 
al. (2001) by looking at cross-sectional dispersion as it 
informs the ex ante risk budgeting decision. The authors 
argue that, in an active management context, active 
positions must be taken in a portfolio in such a way that the 
extent of the position is justified by the size and reliability of 
the expected “alpha”. As such, Yu and Sharaiha (2007) 
presents cross-sectional volatility as a method for measuring 
active management opportunities and what the authors term 
the “alpha-granularity” of markets at any point in time. 
 
In an attempt to address the risk-budgeting decision with 
regards to top-down and bottom-up allocation, Yu and 
Sharaiha (2007) introduces the orthogonal relationship 
between asset allocation dispersion and stock-selection 
dispersion, collectively constituting the total return 
dispersion at any given time. This method enables a 
comparison between these two components of the risk 
budgeting decision within the common basis of the alpha-
opportunities available at the time.  
 
The authors go on to recommend that such an analysis be 
compared to the existing dispersion in the active weights of 
a portfolio to assess whether the alpha-risk budget is being 
invested with similar ratios. A ranked correlation between 
the dispersion within sectors for a portfolio versus the 
dispersion within sectors for a benchmark gives an 
indication of the closeness of the risk budgeting decision 
with the alpha opportunities in the market, although 
portfolios should be constructed in anticipation of future 
alpha opportunities. 
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In Yu and Sharaiha (2007), the authors show by derivation 
that the un-weighted cross-sectional dispersion is directly 
proportional to the returns on a dollar-neutral
5
 investment. 
In this way, the authors propose the use of cross-sectional 
volatility in a hedge fund context as a perfect hindsight 
performance benchmark. They propose that, when assessing 
the skill of the portfolio manager to allocate their risk 
budget, the dispersion of the funds‟ returns be compared to 
the realised dispersion of the appropriate investment 
universe: the higher the correlation between the two, the 
more appropriate the risk budgeting has been.  
 
Finally, Yu and Sharaiha (2007) derive the mathematical 
relationship showing that the expected (weighted) cross-
sectional volatility is equal to a) the differential between the 
weighted average stock volatility and market volatility and 
b) the dispersion among expected stock returns. The authors 
continue, using a multivariate diffusion approach as return 
generating processes, and derive a similar relationship to 
that of Sapra (2008) (refer Equation 3): cross-sectional 
volatility (unweighted) is proportional to the average stock 
return volatility times 1 minus the average correlation 
among stocks. 
 
Yu and Sharaiha (2007) goes so far as to argue that falling 
dispersion (decreasing   
 ) is a business risk to active 
managers, particularly managers of long/short portfolios. As 
such, one of the article‟s suggested remedies for the active 
portfolio management business is to hedge their revenue 
against falling cross-sectional volatility by employing the 
use of variance swaps and/or dispersion trades. 
 
Equation 3: The relationship between cross-sectional 
volatility, average volatility and average correlation 
 
   
    




   
  is the expected weighted cross-sectional volatility, 
 
  
 ̅̅ ̅ is the average security volatility (longitudinal) and 
 
 ̅ is the average correlation between pairs of securities. 
 
Extending the work of De Silva et al. (2001), Sapra (2008) 
looks at the loss of efficiency caused by unexpected (i.e. 
incorrectly forecast) changes in cross-sectional dispersion. 
In this article, an expression relating the estimation error in 
cross-sectional volatility to the realised active risk is derived 
as follows: 
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Equal quantities of long and short investments with a net value of 
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Equation 4: The relationship between unexpected 






   





    and    ̂ are the realised and forecast cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the investment universe respectively 
and, 
 
   and   ̂  are the realised and target active risk of a 
portfolio. 
 
Sapra (2008) shows that this “shock” to cross sectional risk 
implies a decrease in the information ratio of a manager‟s 
realised performance – a ratio which is used as indicator of 
manager skill to potential investors and existing clients.  
 
In Gorman, Sapra and Weigand (2009), the findings of 
Sapra (2008) are extended with an investigation into the 
predictability of cross-sectional volatility using, in 
particular, the VIX
6
 (implied volatility index). Other authors 
such as Ratner, Meric and Meric (2006), Clarke, De Silva 
and Thorley (2010) and Ang, Xing and Zhang (2006) have 
attempted to use cross-sectional dispersion as a predictor of 
stock level performance and volatility. In this article, the 
focus is on the implications of varying cross-sectional 
dispersion for the mandate setting and monitoring process 
rather than forecasting volatility or returns. 
 
This article begins the analytical section with an empirical 
and historical analysis of the changes in cross-sectional 
volatility in the South African equity market showing the 
extent to which cross-sectional variation changes over time. 
The next section explores the impact of varying cross-
sectional dispersion on mandate and fund objective setting, 
particularly the effect on actively managed funds when 
active risk expectations are held constant. Furthermore, this 
section looks at the ongoing monitoring and management of 
active funds‟ mandate compliance with respect to active risk 
as a result of changes in cross-sectional dispersion of 
securities.  
 
Historical cross-sectional dispersion on the JSE 
 
Following the methodology of Ankrim and Ding (2002), the 
weighted cross-sectional volatility for any investment period 
is defined and calculated as follows: 
 
Equation 5: Realised cross sectional variance 
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  is the weighted realised cross-sectional (cs) variation of 
a particular benchmark or index over a particular investment 
period,  
 
       is the weight (typically market capitalisation) of each 
stock,  , at time,    , in the benchmark/index of concern, 
 
     is the total return
7
 for each stock,  , from time     to 
time  , one month later  
 
     is the corresponding benchmark/index return or the 
weighted average return across stocks over the same month. 
 
FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
 
Figure 1 depicts the weighted monthly
8
 cross-sectional 
standard deviation (the square root of Equation 5) over time 
of the FTSE JSE All Share Index or “J203” (the bold line is 
a 6-month moving average of the same). Note the extent of 
the change in cross-sectional standard deviation over time: 
from low levels in the late-90‟s
9
 , increasing in just over 
three years to peak in the recovery just after the 1998 market 
crash (the maximum to date of 21% occurred in October 
1998). The slow decline in cross-sectional volatility from 
1998 seemed to have hit its lowest point in our market 
between 2004 and 2006 (the minimum to date of 4% 
occurred in July 2004) and increased fairly sharply since. 
Although the history presented here is shorter than that 
presented by Bernstein (1998) and De Silva et al. (2001), we 
see similarly low levels of dispersion on the JSE in the mid 
to late 1990‟s picking up at a similar time to the US 
evidence presented in De Silva et al. (2001). However, 1999 
and 2000 saw unprecedented high levels of cross-sectional 
dispersion in the US where, in South Africa, ours had 
already declined substantially. In evidence presented by 
Sapra (2008), over the time of the 2008 financial crisis, he 
showed that the US market appeared to be returning to these 
high levels again in much the same way the South African 
market has in 2008. The most recent year has seen what 
appears to be a very rapid decline in cross-sectional 
dispersion of opportunities on the JSE. 
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The total return was calculated by including all dividends (including 
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Total return therefore represents both capital gain (growth in the share 
price) and dividend yield. 
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It‟s typical in a portfolio management context to use monthly 
performance statistics as a high frequency performance monitoring tool 
towards quarterly and annual performance reports to the client.   It is 




Although J203 index data is available from an earlier date, the number 
of constituents in the index halved from 319 in December 1996 to 155 
in January 1997 as a result of changes in the rules of index 
construction.   This change in diversity of the index has a material 
effect on cross-sectional dispersion and for this reason, data prior to 
January 1997 has been excluded.   “The JSE Actuaries indices were 
replaced by the FTSE/JSE Africa Index Series on the 24th of June 
2002. FTSE and the JSE provided historic data of the indices for the 
period July 1995 to December 2001 and the indicative values from the 
2nd of January 2002 to the 21st of June 2002.” - 
http://ftse.jse.co.za/history_2002.jsp 
In their study of developed market cross-sectional 
correlation, Ankrim and Ding (2002) suggested that one of 
the reasons for the increase in cross-sectional correlation 
that they had observed were that listings may be taking 
place earlier in the life cycle of companies. Presumably they 
were pointing to a greater diversity in listed equities as well 
as a lower concentration in the relative weighting of such 
equities. By way of comparison, Figure shows the number 
of stocks and the effective number of stocks
10
 on the FTSE 
JSE All Share Index since January 1997. 
 
Table 1: Cross-sectional standard deviation on the J203 
(FTSE JSE All Share Index) 
 
Weighted Cross-sectional Std Dev (1996 to 2009) 
Max 20,9% 31-Oct-98 
Median 7,7% 
 
Min 4,1% 31-Jul-04 
Inter Quartile Range 4,0% 
  
 
The J203 has seen a marked decline in both the number of 
stocks and an increase in concentration from 1998 to 2001 
and that could certainly have contributed to the declining 
cross-sectional opportunities evident in the early part of this 
century shown in Figure 1. However, after 2001 there 
doesn‟t seem to be any particular relationship between the 
concentration of the index and the variation in its stocks‟ 
performances. The All Share Index (free float adjustments 





While the cross-sectional diversity of the index is relevant to 
general equity managers and investors, specialised sector 
portfolios or portfolios which prefer to remain sector neutral 
will be concerned with the cross-sectional diversity of the 
sectors within the JSE All Share Index.  
 
Figure 3 displays the weighted cross-sectional standard 
deviation over time of all three major sectors alongside that 
of the JSE All Share Index. Since all three sectors are 
subsets of the All Share Index and by definition, less 
diverse, it‟s not surprising that their cross-sectional 
dispersion is generally lower than the All Share Index itself 
and follows the same historic pattern.  
 
Although the resource sector is by far the most concentrated 
of the three sectors (about 60% of it‟s weighting in three 
stocks), it is the financial sector which has historically 
usually offered the lowest cross-sectional opportunities for 
the active manager. If, as Sapra (2008) argues, the size of 
the cross-sectional standard deviation is an indication of the 
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of stocks in the index if the index was equally weighted.   
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  where    are 






extent of active management that‟s possible in each of these 
sectors, it is important to note the relatively low 
opportunities offered to an active financial sector portfolio 
manager as opposed to those of an industrial or resources 
portfolio manager and provides some support for the 
differences in the expected scale of active performance and 
active risk in these specialist sector portfolios across time. 
 
Implications of cross-sectional volatility and its 
changes for portfolio management and mandate 
setting  
 
In professional portfolio management, the fund sponsor 
and/or consultant and the portfolio manager are both 
concerned with active return generation but can 
inadvertently contaminate their common objective by failing 
to consider how their collective decision-making 
corresponds with the prevailing market conditions.  
 
The consultant or sponsor‟s role is to determine the fund 
objectives using asset/liability concerns, levels of funding, 
legislative properties and risk appetite amongst other 
criteria. In this way the fund sponsor sets out the investment 
objectives and restrictions so that all parties are clear on the 
road ahead. In fact, in relatively new legislation (PF130
11
), 
the requirements for the investment policy statement are 
specifically spelled out in “Principle 8: The Investment 
Performance of Fund Assets”. A substantial part of this 
process is a negotiation of performance expectations which, 
in an active management context, involves setting target 
active risk levels for the fund. For the most part, the 
consultant/sponsor‟s decisions in this regard are independent 
of the portfolio manager‟s investment view and largely 
independent of current market conditions.  
 
The portfolio manager‟s role is to have an investment view 
i.e. to forecast active returns on securities and assets. The 
point of interaction between these two parties is when the 
investment mandate, with its fund objectives and risk 
controls, meets the portfolio manager‟s portfolio 
construction process: the mechanism whereby the 
investment view is translated into an actual investment. By 
way of portfolio construction, the investment view, 
developed in the laboratory of news, information, models, 
history and experience, is translated in the best possible way 
into an allocation of money across a variety of available 
assets. This allocation must meet with a variety of 
constraints: net individual investments that are not too short, 
too concentrated, too geared or traded too often while 
simultaneously aligning with particular styles and ensuring 
neutrality with others. This allocation must be achieved 
while maintaining a given level or band of active risk. 
 
Implications for mandate setting 
 
This section focuses particularly on the setting of active risk 
targets or expectations and its implications on active 
management in varying market conditions. Implementing an 
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Draft circular PF 130: Good governance of retirement funds, 
available online at  
http://www.irf.org.za/Documents/pdf%20files/Legal%20Technical/071
0%20-%20Draft%20Governance%20Circular%20PF130.pdf.  
investment view with a particular active risk in mind 
requires a sufficient “carrying capacity
12
” for active risk 
which varies over time. “Carrying capacity” is a phrase 
borrowed from environmental science and indicates the 
number of individual organisms that can be sustained by an 
ecosystem without negatively impacting the organisms or 
their environment. As such, this ecological notion is an apt 
analogy for the cross-sectional dispersion of an investment 
environment at any given time: without sufficient cross-
sectional dispersion, high active weights cannot be achieved 
without leverage or substantial relaxation of the typical 
mandated portfolio constraints. 
 
As a starting point, we rely on the work of Sapra (2008) and 
presume a so-called “unconstrained” portfolio management 
setting where the active manager is free to invest both long 
and short, in a way that optimally reflects their investment 
view in the portfolio. The active risk of such a portfolio is 
proportional to three particular parameters: a) the active 
weights, b) the cross-sectional risk of the investment 
universe and c) the size of the investment universe.  
 
Equation 6: Active risk components of an unconstrained 
portfolio 
 




   is the target active risk of the portfolio 
 
   is a vector of the active weights or active investment 
positions making up the portfolio and 
 
  is the number of securities in the permitted investment 
environment. 
 
Cross sectional risk and the size of the investment universe, 
are a function of market conditions and the mandated 
investment universe. The previous section showed these 
parameters (particularly the former) to be time-varying and, 
unfortunately, outside of the control of either the fund 
sponsor or the portfolio manager once the portfolio domain 
has been decided. The active weights of a portfolio is the 
domain of the portfolio manager and represents their 
decisions while the target active risk is the expression of the 
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Figure 3: Cross-sectional standard deviation on the FTSE/JSE sectors over time 
 
The relationship between the target active risk and the active 
weights are obvious. The more confident and aggressive the 
active manager in pursuing their investment view, the larger 
the active positions of the portfolio will be and 
consequently, the higher the active risk (all other things 
being equal). Much of the risk budgeting process and the 
active risk expectations are based on this simple principle. 
After all, the ultimate way in which a portfolio manager can 
express themselves is in their active positions. The fund 
sponsor would be wise to expect these to reflect both the 
view and the level of active risk on the part of the portfolio 
manager.  
 
Equation 6 illustrates that the relationship between active 
risk and active weights must also involve the complex, 
multi-dimensional relationships between securities. In 
particular, in the simplified world of the unconstrained 
portfolio manager, the higher the cross-sectional volatility in 
the investment environment, the more easily an active 
portfolio manager can acquire the required active risk. 
Conversely, when the cross-sectional variation “dries up” 
the active manager must implement larger active weights to 
maintain the active risk target. 
 
Good betting strategy would increase the stakes when the 
opportunities are high and vice versa. Following this 
directive, the rational, optimal and unconstrained active 
portfolio manager would take large active positions when 
the market has high cross-sectional dispersion and small 
active positions when the cross-sectional variation is low. 
Consequently, the active risk of their portfolio would wax 
and wane with increases and decreases in the dispersion 
among stocks.  
 
In practice, a widely varying active risk would be a concern 
for fund sponsors who, typically, anchor the active risk for 
their portfolios to a particular range or level, independent of 
market conditions. Fund sponsors may, for example, wish to 
maintain a certain active risk level in a portfolio in order to 
fit their particular long-term risk budgets or funding levels. 
Similarly, active managers can set their sights on a 
particular active risk quantum with which they define their 
particular lack of benchmark-fear
13
! Accordingly the 
rational, optimal active portfolio manager, constrained to a 
rigid active risk, would behave contrary to good betting 
strategy when cross-sectional dispersion changes by 
increasing their active positions in their portfolios when 
opportunities are low and decreasing their bets when the 
market shows greater dispersion in security returns.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, this capacity of the FTSE/JSE to 
deliver active risk-taking opportunities has been reducing 
steadily since the 1998 recovery to 2007. Given the 
relationship between cross-sectional volatility and active 
risk, portfolio managers and sponsors should have become 
accustomed to steadily decreasing active risk in their 
portfolios over that period. But if sponsors and managers 
required constant levels of active risk throughout this period, 
active managers would have become accustomed to 
increasing active weights and, for managers whose 
mandates allow the incurring of liabilities, increased 
gearing. According to Tobin‟s Separation Theorem (Tobin, 
1958) and its application in an active management 
framework, if you can‟t achieve the same amount of active 
risk as you‟ve learnt to expect historically in a low 
opportunity market, the most efficient solution is to gear up.  
 
Khandani and Lo (2007) put forward the un-testable 
hypothesis that this kind of behaviour by hedge fund 
managers likely precipitated the hedge fund crisis of August 
2007: cross-sectional volatility had been diminishing for 
years (as were the returns to over-crowded strategies) but 
clients and managers resisted allowing their active risk and 
return expectations to wane in response. Consequently, the 
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“Benchmark-fear” is one of the hypotheses that Bernstein (1998) put 
forward as a possible explanation for the decline in fund performance 













































strategies remained the same but the gearing increased as the 
carrying capacity decreased, leaving many hedge funds in an 
irresponsibly vulnerable position when the credit crunch 
came. 
 
Gearing and credit-risk are less of a concern in the realm of 
long-only portfolio management (typical of South African 
pension fund mandates). However, long-only managers are 
not immunised from the effects of decreasing cross-sectional 
volatility. The long-only active manager, like his/her 
unconstrained counterparts, can only maintain a constant 
active risk in a market with decreasing dispersion by 
increasing their active weights. However, the long only 
manager will, at some point, for some assets, meet the 
boundary of the negative active weights possible for 
securities that can only be held long. When all the 
opportunities to express their investment view without 
corruption have been used up, the long-only manager must 
increase active weights in areas where they can rather than 
where their investment view implies they should. Large fund 
size, a small and concentrated investment universe, and 
several additional mandated risk controls and limits 
exacerbate this distortion of the investment view.  
 
In this way, when the decision makers set portfolio 
mandates and objectives with rigid, under-researched active 
risk targets and portfolio constraints, the translation of an 
investment view into a portfolio of investments becomes 
distorted with changes in the “carrying capacity” of their 
investment universe. In particular, when the cross-sectional 
variation in the market reduces, the resulting portfolio can 
be too active for the carrying capacity of its investment 
universe and, worse still, inconsistent with the manager‟s 
investment view. Furthermore, when the portfolio 
manager‟s performance is assessed, the ex post performance 
of the portfolio might bear little resemblance to the portfolio 
managers‟ intended source of active return. (The next 
section deals with some of the implications of the time 
varying nature of cross-sectional variation with regards to 
performance monitoring.)  
 
Therefore, when setting the investment objectives of a fund, 
fund sponsors should be mindful of the tools at each 
decision maker‟s disposal as well as the conditions of the 
market at each point in time. Fund sponsors can set target 
active risk levels and portfolio managers can widen the 
active weights but, if these requirements and the portfolio‟s 
constraints aren‟t matched to the market‟s capacity to 
deliver active return (i.e. the cross-sectional dispersion on 
the market), the investment process can be considerably 
contaminated.  
 
Mandate compliance and forecast errors 
 
When fund sponsors monitor mandate compliance and 
whether their selected managers are delivering according to 
the sponsors‟ expectations, they will typically receive 
performance reports using forecast active risk and 
information ratios as indications of the positioning of the 
portfolio. Using an established and accepted risk model 
representing the investment universe (usually provided by 
an independent service provider and based for the most part 
on ex post stock behaviour), the ex ante active risk will be 
calculated by multiplying the current active positions in the 
portfolio (which are required to be mandate compliant) by 
the covariance matrix of forecast active returns (refer 
Equation 7). 
 
Equation 7: Ex-ante active risk estimation 






   is the ex-ante active risk forecast and 
 
  is the covariance matrix of forecast active returns 
 
Many fund sponsors and active managers in South Africa 
were taken by surprise by a growing increase in their active 
risks over 2007 and continuing into 2008. In several cases, 
mandated risk levels were enforced and active portfolio 
positions were cut in order to bring portfolios back to 
compliant levels. The source of these dramatic increases in 
ex ante active risk forecasts lay in the steep increase in the 
JSE‟s cross-sectional risk from 2007 to 2008 evident in 
Figure 1. In the simplified expression of the relationship 
between realised active risk and forecast active risk, 
developed in Sapra (2008) (refer Equation 4), the forecast 
error in active risk is shown to be directly proportional to the 
forecast error in cross-sectional standard deviation. By 
implication then, if portfolio managers and sponsors are 
neglecting to monitor the changes in cross-sectional 
standard deviation by using long-term longitudinal risk 
models, the anticipated ex ante active risk can be 
surprisingly different to the realised active risk and 
insensitive to changes in the active management 
environment. 
 
To illustrate the extent of this potential “shock” to active 
risk estimations, Figure 4 shows the ratio of the realised 
cross-sectional standard deviation to its one month lag. This 
provides an indication of the error multiple of forecast active 
risk from month to month (for fund sponsors who receive 
monthly performance reports).  
 
The extent to which the realised active risk differed from the 
targeted active risk, implied by this relationship between 
realised and forecast cross-sectional standard deviation, 
varied between 40% to nearly double the active risk realised 
compared to the intended active risk of the portfolio. By 
implication, when using active risk as a measure of mandate 
compliance, the potential decision making consequences are 
severe. If the realised active risk is considered unexpectedly 
high, the portfolio manager could be required to cut 
positions which, under different market circumstances, 
would have been quite acceptable and vice versa. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the potential drift in the accuracy of the 
forecast active risk over a calendar year using increasing 
lags from each year-end in the ratio of realised cross-
sectional standard deviation. This illustration attempts to 
show, on a calendar year basis, the effect of changes in 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the relative size of the shock to active 
risk that the year 2008 presented in our market. There were 
times within 2008 where the realised active risk would have 
been two and a half times the size implied by the January 
cross-sectional risk of the market, making asset managers 
appear to have radically increased their risk appetites when 
in fact the equity market was simply changing the spread in 
its investment offerings. 
 
The implication of this relationship between cross-sectional 
market conditions and active risk forecasts is that sponsors 
should expect the active risk estimate of any portfolio to 
vary under varying market conditions. A change in an ex 
ante active risk could be an indication of changing active 
weights or portfolio aggression, which is why this 
monitoring is important. However, it is also very possible 
that changes in the ex-ante active risk of a portfolio is 
simply a reaction to changes in market conditions. Sponsors 
and their managers should therefore exercise caution when 
reacting to short term changes in this estimate on their 




Cross-sectional volatility and its changes are a good 
measure of the investment opportunity set for active 
managers. The more dispersed the returns of investments 
are, the more opportunities there are for active managers to 
perform differently (preferably better!) from their 
competitors and the benchmark. 
 
Cross-sectional volatility has changed substantially over 
time as have the opportunities for superior active 
performance and there is no reason to expect that the cross-
sectional risk of the market won‟t continue to vary over 
time. The relationship between this changing cross-sectional 
volatility and the dispersion of active portfolio managers 
further illustrates the importance of cross-sectional volatility 
to active management. 
 
Ex ante, cross-sectional volatility must be considered hand-
in-hand with risk limits and active risk targets when 
mandates are set or monitored. The higher the cross-
sectional volatility, the greater the opportunity for active risk 
taking, all other things being equal. Conversely, to remain 
efficient, active risk taking should be reduced during periods 
of low cross-sectional dispersion. 
 
Furthermore, when fund sponsors monitor changes in an ex 
ante active risk they should bear in mind that changes in the 
active risk forecast of a portfolio could be a reaction to 
changes in market conditions and not the result of changes 
in the active positions of the fund. Sponsors and their 
managers should therefore exercise caution when reacting to 
changes in active risk estimates, mindful of the relationship 
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